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THE INEVITABILITY (AND
DESIRABILITY?.) OF AVOIDANCE:
A RESPONSE TO DEAN KLOPPENBERG
Melvyn R. Durchslagt
INTRODUCTION
At the point in my Constitutional Law course when we incant the
watchword of our judicial faith-"[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"-I tell my
students that, in one way or another, we will spend the balance of the
semester trying to figure out what that statement means. More often
than not they look at me skeptically or grumble under their breath,
"What? Is this guy nuts?" I may well be. But much of what law pro-
fessors and judges do in constitutional law is debate that very ques-
tion. Indeed, the central question of constitutional law is the so-called
who decides question, or as it more directly relates to the question of
avoidance, "who decides what questions, and when and how do they
decide them?"
Dean Kloppenberg, in her paper today,2 and in previous writings,3
apparently takes Chief Justice Marshall at his word, particularly the
duty part of his admonition. In doing so, she takes issue with Justice
Brandeis's famous concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority4 questioning the premises upon which he advocated avoid-
ance of constitutional questions and offering an alternative position:
"The rights protection function of the courts, particularly federal
courts in our democratic system, as well as the 'paramount impor-
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I thank Bob Strassfeld for reading
an earlier draft of this paper and saving me from some embarrassing errors. Kimberley Spagna
did an admirable job of filling in the research gaps.
I Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote Judicial Inde-
pendence? 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1031 (2006).
3 LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD
CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW (2001).
4 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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tance' of constitutional adjudication should lead to less avoidance of
constitutional issues by the courts, not more."' 5 "At least," she argues,
"there ought to be a presumption against avoidance rather than the
other way around."6
On a number of points Dean Kloppenberg and I agree completely.
First, it is troublesome when courts abandon or defer to popularly
elected branches of government the protection of individual rights,
certainly when those rights are asserted by minorities and those who
hold unpopular views.7 Moreover, I respect her result-neutral ap-
proach. It matters not to Dean Kloppenberg whether a particular
Court is likely to come out on the "right" side of a constitutional dis-
pute. What is important is that the Court perform the constitutional
role that Marbury staked out for it-to say what the law is.
Second, Dean Kloppenberg is certainly correct that some of the
oft-cited benefits of avoidance have proven to be illusory.8 Narrow
construction of syndicalism statutes during the early and mid-1950s
did nothing to ease tensions between the Court and Congress. Quite
the contrary.9 Nor did it lead to any sensible constitutional conversa-
tion either about the limits of political dissent in Congress, between
Congress and the Courts, or more generally in the polity as a whole.
The same can be said of the Court's far more recent construction (if
one may call it that) of the jurisdictional statute enacted by Congress
to resolve the Schiavo case,'0 or Justice Breyer's valiant rescue of the
federal mandatory sentencing statute in United States v. Booker.'
Moreover, the "judicious" use of standing, mootness, and justiciabil-
ity to avoid "substantive" constitutional rulings has made Establish-
ment Clause doctrine look like a model of clarity and predictability.1
2
Kloppenberg, supra note 2, at 1035.
6 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 3, at 277.
7 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing that intrusive judi-
cial review ought to be limited to those situations in which minority interests can not be pro-
tected by the normal workings of pluralistic politics).
8 See Phillip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon,
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93
CAL. L. REV. 397 (2005); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices ofthe "Passive Virtues"-A Com-
ment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); see also
Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself. Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme
Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005).
9 Frickey, supra note 8, at 426-32 (noting how a defiant Congress passed numerous bills
to override decisions of the Warren Court).
10 See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1086 (2005);
Schindler v. Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), application for stay of enforcement
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1622 (2005); Schiavo ex. rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir.),
application for stay of enforcement denied, 125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005).
11 543 U.S. 220, 243-71 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering Court's opinion, in part).
12 For a better understanding of the perils of using the Establishment Clause as a model of
clarity and predictability, see, for example, B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Con-
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The "passive virtues" may be a legal realist teacher's dream, but the
doctrine is an incoherent muddle.
13
Third, a device, designed, in part at least, to express judicial humil-
ity and fallibility ends up being the ultimate tool of judicial discretion,
and, (although I hate the term), judicial activism. 14 Finally, there is
the matter of statutory interpretation to avoid constitutional issues. As
Dean Kloppenberg argues, 15 avoidance strategies, certainly those in-
volving restrictive statutory interpretation, are punctuated, either ex-
plicitly or by inference, with constitutional dictum and/or assumptions
about how the constitutional issues might have been decided had the
Court not avoided them, or what the Court might have to say about
this or a similar statute if Congress does not clean up its act (so to
speak).16 And while Professor Frickey might argue that this is all part
of what constitutional adjudication ought to be about,1 7 one cannot
help being both skeptical and troubled.
Does that mean I agree with Dean Kloppenberg that avoidance
techniques ought to be (pardon the intentional redundancy) avoided,
if not at all costs, at least in a presumptive way? No. Preliminarily, I
offer three reasons. First, as the title to this paper suggests, judicial
avoidance is an inevitable by-product of a system that separates the
judiciary from the political branches-there is simply nothing that we
can do about it. Second, while avoidance often does little to advance
the cause of individual liberties, at least it can stave off an erosion of
individual liberties when structural norms restrain the Court's ability
to recognize or expand individual rights. Finally, as others have ar-
gued, avoidance can contribute to reducing constitutional confusion in
those cases in which constitutional consensus is out of reach.18 Each
of these propositions will be considered separately. My purpose here
is not to extensively analyze each of these assertions. Rather I simply
want to raise some questions that have troubled me about the position
that avoidance costs us more than we receive back in benefits.
text: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REv. 491 (2005).
13 See, e.g., KLOPPENBERG, supra note 3, at 39-66 (discussing standing to enforce federal
environmental statutes).
14 Gunther, supra note 8, at 25 ("Bickel's 'virtues' are ... a virulent variety of free-
wheeling interventionism.").
15 Kloppenberg, supra note 2, at 1037-41.
16 Id.; see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 939-40 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (bemoaning the majority's federalism dictum and its inconsistency with Gonzales v. Raich,
125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005)).
17 Frickey, supra note 8, at 402 ("[T1he avoidance canon ... is a tool of constitutional
law.").
18 See CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JuDIcIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 4, 263 (1999).
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Before doing so, however, a word about the complexity of the
subject matter. Avoidance techniques take many forms:19 construing
statutes to avoid constitutional rulings if at all reasonable to do so;
20
invoking both constitutional and prudential "rules" of standing,
justiciability, and ripeness/mootness to avoid "substantive"
constitutional rulings; confining constitutional rulings to the peculiar
facts of the case before it rather than making broad constitutional
pronouncements; remanding a case to the lower courts for further
development of the facts rather than deciding the case on the record
before the Court; distinguishing sometimes indistinguishable
precedent to avoid broader rulings that would overrule those
precedents; using overbreadth and vagueness doctrines in first
amendment cases to avoid more far-reaching theories; abstaining
rather than deciding certain questions; and most obviously, using
discretionary review to allow a constitutional issue to "percolate" in
the lower courts or to avoid the difficulties attendant to a lack of
consensus.
To explore each of these is well beyond the limited scope of this
response. Suffice it to say that each avoidance technique presents its
own problems and has its own benefits. It is consequently difficult,
indeed inaccurate, to lump them together in an effort either to con-
demn or to praise them. With that in mind, the next section will
briefly discuss the inevitability of avoidance devices.
I.
Avoidance did not begin with Justice Brandeis's opinion in As-
wander but has its origins far earlier than that.2' The reason is sim-
19 The various avoidance techniques that follow are discussed in a variety of sources. See,
e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1986); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2.4-2.8, 11.2.2 (2d ed. 2002); KLOPPENBERG, supra note 3; SUN-
STEIN, supra note 18; Gunther, supra note 8.
20 Addressing the appropriate remedy for a statute requiring that a minor notify her par-
ents prior to seeking an abortion, the Court in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006) outlined "[t]hree interrelated principles": (1) "we try not to
nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary"; (2) "mindful that our constitutional
mandate and institutional competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from 'rewrit[ing] state
law to conform it to constitutional requirements"'; and (3) "a court cannot 'use its remedial
power to circumvent the intent of the legislature."' Id. at 967-68 (emphasis added). Of course,
there is a wide margin between interpreting ambiguous statutory language and "rewriting" a
statute. Like beauty, the difference is often in the eyes of the beholder.
21 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 441 (1821) ("[1]t will be unnecessary,
and consequently improper, to pursue any inquiries, which would then be merely speculative,
respecting the power of Congress in the case."); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356
(1911) ("[T]his court has consistently declined to exercise any powers other than those which
are strictly judicial in their nature."); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 354-55
(1936) (discussing previous cases that recognize the importance of judicial avoidance into the
[Vol. 56:41046
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pie-the so-called majoritarian difficulty. Marbury carved out for the
Court the constitutional responsibility of saying "what the law is."
But it was not without recognition that some matters, while they may
raise constitutional concerns, are beyond the Court's purview, in that
case "discretionary" acts of the executive.22 Sixteen years after Mar-
bury, in McCulloch v. Maryland,23 Chief Justice Marshall recognized
that the Court's power to assess the constitutionality of congressional
legislation had its limits, despite the broad language of Marbury: "to
undertake here to inquire into the degree of its [referring to the means
Congress adopts to achieve its ends] necessity, would be to pass the
line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on leg-
islative,2 fround. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a
power.
The point is not to suggest that Marshall's recognition of certain
matters of executive and legislative discretion as being beyond the
Court's power to adjudicate were exercises in avoidance. Far from it.
It is to suggest, however, that the Court, even in its more hegemonic
moments, understood that its decisions had to account for the powers
and prerogatives of the other branches of government. And that is
precisely what avoidance, at its most fundamental dimension, pur-
ports to achieve. As Professor Frickey argues, "the avoidance canon
is not so much a maxim of statutory interpretation as it is a tool of
constitutional law., 25 Dean Kloppenberg appears to agree: "the Court
predicates its avoidance doctrine on the separation of powers princi-
ple (respecting the power of other federal branches); federalism con-
cerns (respecting the powers of the states); .. . [and] the final and
delicate nature of judicial review ... ,26 These are constitutional, not
prudential, concerns. They recognize the limits of judicial power, not
the limits of judicial discretion.
I am not arguing that if the Court were to abandon using avoidance
techniques, the result would be a runaway Court, stretching or break-
ing the outer limits of its constitutional authority. Nevertheless, when
the Court and Congress (to say nothing of the executive) are struc-
tured to share law-making authority, how else, other than through
some kind of what is broadly defined as avoidance, is a court to
sphere of legislative power).
22 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803).
23 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
24 Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
25 Frickey, supra note 8, at 402.
26 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 3, at 3.
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"function in the real world? ' 27 Dean Kloppenberg would undoubtedly
answer-"by performing the role the Constitution gives it-
interpreting the constitution in a principled way rather than avoiding
constitutional questions in a way that only leads to confusion, consti-
tutional dictum, inconsistency, and a host of other problems." I am
skeptical. Even if it is correct that we make too much of the down-
sides of constitutional confrontation between the Court and Con-
gress,28 and, indeed, even if we may at times be better off with clarity
of constitutional rules rather than the ambiguity that avoidance some-
times produces, 29 I doubt these arguments will, can, or maybe should
trump inherent worries about the limits of the Court's role in an oth-
erwise "democratic" polity.
In short, all of the cries for abandonment, presumptive abandon-
ment, or curtailment of the use of avoidance is likely to be for naught.
We are stuck with it-in one form or another, avoidance will be part
of our jurisprudential future as it has been part of our past, nearly
from the inception of the Republic. Maybe the best we can hope for is
that avoidance be used more selectively and when used, not abused.
II.
No branch of government functions without recognition of the
others.3° Congress rarely enacts legislation that it knows will be
vetoed by the executive, certainly without assurance of an override.
And the executive rarely proposes legislation that it knows will be
"dead on arrival," except maybe as a negotiation strategy. Nor will
the executive ordinarily veto legislation knowing it will suffer a
certain override by Congress.31 Rather, Congress will ordinarily tailor
its legislation to avoid executive objections, and the executive will
draft legislation to anticipate congressional complaints. Things do not
change when the judiciary is added to the equation. Except when
scoring political points, Congress ordinarily attempts to craft its laws
27 Frickey, supra note 8, at 443; see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term-Foreward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 50 (1961-1962) ('"he Court
exists in the Lincolnian tension between principle and expediency.").
2 Kloppenberg, supra note 2, at 1034.
29 For further discussion of the balance between clarity of constitutional rules and the am-
biguity of avoidance, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 56-57; Siegel, supra note 8, at 2006.
30 Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 311-13 (2005)
(reviewing positive scholarship describing the "separation of powers game").
31 When the bill to prohibit the United States from engaging in torture was first introduced
in the United States Senate (National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005)),
the president vehemently opposed it. But when it became clear that it would pass both houses of
Congress with veto proof majorities, he signed it, albeit accompanied by a "signing statement."
[Vol. 56:41048
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to meet anticipated judicial concerns.32 And even in these days of the
unitary executive, it is rare that executive action is taken without
some reference to the constitutional parameters established by the
Supreme Court.33
The Court tends to play by the same rules. When it decides cases,
the Court is well aware of the institutional and structural impacts of
its rulings. I am not referring here to the Court's looking over its
collective shoulder to measure congressional, executive, or popular
reaction, though studies would suggest that more of that goes on than
many, at least law professors, care to admit.34 Rather, I am referring
to the Court's interpretation of individual rights to account for values
of constitutional federalism and separation of powers.35 It is well
established that individual rights have, on occasion, been given a
narrow interpretation to account for federalism values.36  Most
recently, in Johnson v. California,37 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, refused to recognize as race discrimination the California
Department of Correction's unwritten policy of temporarily
separating newly arrived prisoners on the basis of race for a period of
sixty days. Rather, Thomas said, this was a case of state prison
administration, which required the Court to defer to the discretion of
state corrections officials.38 Even Justice O'Connor's majority
32 Two examples will suffice. In Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Court invali-
dated several sections of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. Congress then enacted the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998), in an attempt to cure the defects
noted by the Court in Reno. It did not work-in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004), the
Court upheld a preliminary injunction against enforcement of COPA. The other example is
Congress's rewriting of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) to add a "jurisdictional element" that the Court in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), found lacking.
33 In defending his warrantless interception of certain international telephone conversa-
tions, President Bush cited to Supreme Court authority that, in his judgment, gave him the legal
authority to do what he did. President George W. Bush, Landon Lecture at Kan. State Univ.
(Jan. 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle
2006/01/23/AR200601230093 lpf.html).
3 Friedman, supra note 30, at 320-29 (discussing the role public opinion may play in the
decision-making of the Supreme Court).
35 Barry Friedman argues that restraints on the Court's constitutional decision-making are
not by any means limited to the formalism of separation of powers and federalism. Congress's
power to alter the number of judges sitting on a court, to impeach federal judges, to strip a court
of its jurisdiction, and to starve the judiciary through its control of the budget invariably have an
impact on a court's "independence." The same can be said of the executive's power to enforce
(or not) judicial orders, to say nothing of the president's bully pulpit. Friedman, supra note 30,
at 313-16.
36 See, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties: Varying the
Remedy To Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723 (1979); Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 912 (1987) ("Constitutional law is often an uneasy mixture of substantive
theory and institutional constraint. The existence of institutional limits ... forces the courts to
limit the scope of substantive constraints on government action.").
37 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).
38 Id. at 1157-71 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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opinion, over Justice Stevens's objections, 39 did not hold that the
California policy was unconstitutional race discrimination. n Instead
the case was remanded to the district court to afford the state the
opportunity to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest in the
racial separation policy and that no less drastic means were available
to implement that interest.
To further illustrate my point, I will mention two additional cases,
one involving separation of powers and the other federalism. Separa-
tion of powers concerns, like federalism, have had an impact on the
scope of individual liberties. The First Amendment is replete with
cases in which respect for the prerogatives of the political branches
have trumped free speech assertions, ranging from the respect for
military regulations regarding the headgear its personnel are permit-
ted to wear4' to the deference shown the Park Service regarding the
use of national parks for first amendment activity42 to respecting
Congress' judgment about the corrosive effect of campaign money on
the democratic process.43
Perhaps the crowning example of separation of powers limiting in-
dividual liberties was Koramatsu v. United States" in which the
Court, despite its incantations of how abhorrent racial classifications
were,45 essentially deferred to the judgment of the military governor
of the Western Defense Command that security concerns warranted
removal of all Japanese, aliens and citizens alike, from their homes to
inland "detention centers."
Now, Koramatsu was decided sixty-one years ago, ten years be-
fore Brown v. Board of Education.46 We have come along way since
then. Coupled with all of the mea culpas that occurred since
Koramatsu,47 it is tempting to say that such a result would never reoc-
cur today. If the Court would simply enforce the constitutional norm
articulated in Brown and its progeny, avoidance by deference in cases
like this would be a thing of the past. Not so fast. The late Chief Jus-
tice was not confident that the same result would not obtain if similar
circumstances arose today. 48 And given the dissenting opinion in
39 Id. at 1153-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 1152.
41 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
42 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1983).
43 McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
- 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
45 Id. at 240.
46 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47 The culmination of this country's collective guilt was a statute that compensated those
who were incarcerated (and/or their families) in the detention centers. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989
(1988).
48 WILLIAM H. REiHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 218-25 (1998).
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Johnson, and Justice Thomas's dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,49 it is
likely that Chief Justice Rehnquist has two adherents.
Was there an alternative? Justice Jackson thought so. In a dissent-
ing opinion that was avoidance writ large, Jackson, always the realist,
argued for no decision at all: "the existence of a military power rest-
ing on force, so vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the
individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I would not lead people
to rely on this Court for a review that [is] wholly delusive." 50 Put in a
more modem setting, the plurality's decision on the process due Mr.
Hamdi and his fellow prisoners accounted for the president's exten-
sive and largely indefinable war powers,5' just as the process due a
prisoner who is transferred to a "super-max" facility accounts for the
fact that federal courts are not equipped to micromanage state and
federal prisons.52
In one sense, Koramatsu proves one of Dean Kloppenberg's
points, not mine. If one of the benefits of avoidance is to promote
democratic values by engaging a conversation between Congress and
the courts (and in the polity generally) regarding constitutional val-
ues,5 3 certainly that conversation is prompted more by the contrasting
opinions of Justices Black and Murphy than by Justice Jackson's
avoidance dissent. On the other hand, was the cause of racial equality,
or individual liberty more generally, enhanced or diminished by the
substantive interpretation of the equal protection clause in Kormatsu
and the later mea culpas (which I assume count as part of the consti-
tutional dialogue)? I do not know the answer. Nor do I think that the
answer is even knowable. But in light of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinions, I cannot lightly dismiss Justice Jackson's observations.
The other example looks at the same problem but from the
perspective of federalism. The avoidance technique was to deny
standing, and the case was the much maligned City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons.54 In Lyons, the Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to
obtain an injunction against the use of choke holds by the Los
Angeles police department because he could not demonstrate that he
was in danger of being subject to choke holds in the future. He could
49 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2674-78 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). For an extended discussion of
Hamdi and the use of avoidance, see Siegel, supra note 8, at 1997-2000.
o 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944).
SI 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646-48 (2004).
52 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005).
53 See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 3, at 274; SUNSTEIN, supra note 18. If, however, con-
gressional reaction to the Schiavo and Booker cases is any gauge, the extrajudicial constitutional
debate that law and political science professors so yearn for may well be little more than a
collective dream.
- 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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still sue for damages, although that claim also might not have
produced a clear ruling on the constitutionality of using choke holds
because of qualified immunity.5 So the standing ruling avoided the
question of whether the policy of using choke holds when an officer's
life was not threatened constituted a substantive due process
violation, as the district and Ninth Circuit courts had held.56
The impact of Lyons on access to the federal courts to challenge
police excesses is not to be underestimated. 57 And in terms of where
my sympathies lie, I would have liked the Supreme Court to have
affirmed the Court of Appeals and said very clearly that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a police offi-
cer from using potentially deadly force except when she reasonably
believes that her life or that of another person is in danger. Any pol-
icy, written or otherwise, that permits the use of deadly force in cir-
cumstances other than that is unconstitutional, and may be enjoined.
But I am not at all confident that would have been the outcome given
the Court's history of tempering individual rights claims in the name
of federalism.
It is true that the Court in Lyons may have overplayed its federal-
ism hand. It could have reached the substantive due process issue and
enjoined the Los Angeles police regulation without significantly alter-
ing the relationship between the federal courts and the states by sub-
jecting everyday police activity in every police department in the
country to potential federal contempt proceedings. It would have been
no different than enjoining any statute or ordinance on constitutional
grounds. After all, the plaintiff alleged and the district court found
that the city authorized the use of potentially deadly choke holds even
when no danger of violence existed.58 But the police saw the case as
potentially putting federal judges in every police precinct in the coun-
try. 59 And, correctly or incorrectly, the Court apparently agreed, view-
ing Lyons as opening the door to widespread systemic relief against
police departments nationwide.6° As the Court had previously held
such federal judicial monitoring of local and state governments was a
55 See generally Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (discussing the avail-
ability of qualified immunity for officers of the executive branch); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
557 (1967) (discussing the requirements of good faith and probable cause for police officers to
be granted qualified immunity).
5 Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 646 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming the district
court's ruling granting a preliminary injunction aginst police use of choke holds).
57 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 3, at 67-75; Siegel, supra note 8, at 1963, 1966.
58 Lyons, 461 U.S at 113-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 132; see also KLOPPENBERG, supra note 3, at 69.
60 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112.
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threat to federalism. 61 In light of these concerns, would it have been
"better" for the Court to have confronted the substantive due process
issue head on? Certainly a constitutional conversation could have
taken place. But at what cost? Was it "better" to limit the scope of the
right, as was likely,62 or avoid that and limit standing? A case can be
made for the latter. When separation of powers and/or federalism
concerns act to limit the scope of individual liberties, as is too often
the case, (a) the Court gives the political branches a green light to
proceed in a rights restrictive way even when the structural concerns
are not nearly so pressing, and (b) the Court helps generate a rights
restrictive inertia that may be difficult to overcome.
63
In sum, it is not necessarily true that the life tenure protected fed-
eral judiciary is more able to protect individual liberties than the po-
litical branches of federal government or the largely elected state
court systems. The constraints are different, political in the latter and
structural in the former. But history has demonstrated that structural
norms can be as corrosive of individual liberties as political responsi-
bility. And that is assuming that the federal judiciary is agnostic to
political considerations. 64
III.
For those who criticize judicial avoidance, the confusion created
by the selective use of avoidance and the hypothetical nature of the
constitutional inquiry when the Court interprets a statute in order to
avoid a constitutional ruling rank high on their scale of objections.
And they have a point. The selective use of the avoidance trilogy-
standing, ripeness/mootness, and justiciability-is hardly the model
of clarity. Indeed the doctrine (such as it is) is all but incomprehensi-
ble. Narrow construction of statutes to avoid constitutional questions
adds confusion of a different nature. Despite Professor Frickey's as-
61 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (finding that the principles of federalism
limit the application of injunctive relief against the executive branch of a state or local govern-
ment); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 498 (1974) (noting that principles of federalism limit
federal courts' interference "with the normal operation of state administration of its criminal
laws").
62 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-700 (1976) (finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not encompass a right not to be defamed); Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378-79 (finding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create a broad right to equitable relief from the action of a state
executive branch).
63 But see Gunther, supra note 8, at 7 ("The legitimation notion is open to question as a
description of the political impact of a Supreme Court decision rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge on the merits.").
6 See Friedman, supra note 30, at 259-60 (arguing that normative constitutional scholars
severely underestimate the role of "politics" [broadly defined] in federal courts' constitutional
interpretation).
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sertion that the dictum used to articulate the possible constitutional
objections to a statute, which the Court then decides (for reasons of
avoidance) does not exist, is a good means to enforce "underenforced
constitutional norms,, 65 dictum is dictum. It may be adhered to in
cases in which avoidance is not appropriate, and it may not. It is cer-
tainly easy to distinguish a case in which the Constitution is used as a
backdrop for statutory interpretation from one in which the constitu-
tional issue is fully briefed, argued, and considered. Moreover, the
constitutional expression is hypothetical and highly contingent, mak-
ing its precedential value suspect, whatever one may say about
whether the constitutional musings are dictum or not.66
On the other hand, is it more likely that clarity will be enhanced if
constitutional issues are confronted directly, on their merits? Not nec-
essarily. Indeed, reading some recent Court opinions, one might yearn
for a little avoidance here and there.67 The Court is as ideologically
divided as the country itself. That is the reason so much time, effort,
and money poured into the recent nomination hearings of Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justice Alito. Given an ideologically divided Court,
in which consensus around a constitutional principle is difficult if not
impossible to garner, is avoidance such a bad alternative? 68 In terms
of the educative functions of the Court, are we worse off with an
opinion that stretches the meaning of a statute to avoid a fractured
opinion than we are with the confusion produced by a divided Court
in which no opinion stands as the reasoning?
Early in the 2005-2006 term, the Court decided Gonzales v. Ore-
gon,69 the Oregon physician assisted suicide case. As many people
predicted, the Court avoided the difficult constitutional issues by
holding that the Controlled Substances Act7° did not authorize the
Attorney General to determine what was a "medically appropriate
use" of a drug.71 As Justice Scalia's dissent argued, the majority's
65 Frickey, supra note 8, at 462.
66 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 939-40 (2006) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (bemoaning
the majority's federalism dictum and its inconsistency with Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195
(2005)).
67 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (containing six sepa-
rate opinions); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (containing five
separate opinions).
68 Cf. Frickey, supra note 8, at 439 & n.252 (noting that avoidance is used less frequently
when the Court and Congress are politically aligned). One reason is that when the Court and the
elected branches are politically aligned, the Court's decisions can be bolder. See Friedman,
supra note 30, at 318 (noting that legislative and executive branches have little incentive to
combat judicial activism when they agree ideologically with the courts).
69 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
70 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
71 ld.
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interpretation of the statute was anything but preordained.7 2 But it
disposed of the case, at least until Congress decides (if it ever does) to
explicitly give the executive the power it claimed. Let us imagine
what the opinion (opinions actually) would have looked like if the
Court had tackled the difficult issue of whether Congress had the
power under the Commerce Clause to override state determinations of
appropriate medical care specifically and, more generally, the state's
supervision of those whom it licenses. And then there are the imbed-
ded individual liberty claims of due process/death with dignity and
equal protection, reminiscent of Roe v. Wade73-the wealthy who can
afford private physicians can die as they choose in the privacy of their
own homes, but the poor and lower middle class, dependent on pub-
licly funded clinics or HMOs, cannot. Consensus would be difficult to
come by on all three plausible constitutional objections.
In terms of constitutional clarity, would we be better off had the
Court grappled with the difficult constitutional issues that Gonzales
presented, rather than Justice Kennedy's vague references to Con-
gress's Commerce Clause power 74 and Justice Thomas's confused
response regarding how the majority's federalism concerns can be
squared with Raich v. Gonzales?75 A firm "yes" answer is problem-
atic. If I asked my clerk (or legislative intern) to tell me whether Con-
gress could legislate in the area after Gonzales v. Oregon, would she
be in any better position to advise me with an opinion that read "Jus-
tice X announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion
in which Justices Y and Z concur in parts I, II A, and C, and in which
Justice D concurs in part III E, etc., etc.," than she would be with an
avoidance opinion that commanded a six Justice majority? I may be
missing something, but I do not see how.
CONCLUSION
It may not sound like it, but I am ambivalent about avoidance
techniques. They are clearly useful sometimes and not so useful at
other times. They are least useful, and do the most systemic damage,
when the technique involves purported interpretations of Article EI
standing and justiciability. More often than not, little is gained by
postponing the "substantive" constitutional issue, except to further
muddle an already incoherent doctrine. More importantly, the muddle
72 Gonzlaes, 126 S. Ct. at 926-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 937-38.
75 Id. at 939-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195
(2005)).
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is a constitutional muddle, since the Court is allegedly interpreting
Article 11. So the impact on future cases can be dramatic, denying
judicial access to an unknowable number of persons with legitimate
constitutional injury. Yet, sometimes the benefits might be worth the
costs. Lyons, for example, where federalism was likely to lead to a
greater restriction of individual liberties than the denial of standing, is
one such case. Moreover, that risk is reduced if the Court, as it did in
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,76 resorts to "pruden-
tial" rather than constitutional standing.
In contrast to Dean Kloppenberg, I am far less troubled by the
Court's maybe questionable statutory interpretation to avoid constitu-
tional questions. Even though that position ignores all sensible canons
of statutory construction, and probably does no more to quiet legisla-
tive disaffection than a declaration of unconstitutionality,77 at least
Congress has an outlet for its anger. And canons of interpretation
aside, the implausible interpretation of one statute to avoid a constitu-
tional issue, particularly one on which consensus cannot be achieved,
will not carry over to the next case. In other words, there is often little
or no systemic harm from the statutory construction avoidance device
even if constitutional dictum is imbedded in the opinion. And as far as
individual liberties are concerned, the legislature has precisely the
same options as it did before the Court's action. True, as Dean Klop-
penberg argues, avoidance often preserves the status quo, to the det-
riment of minorities and those whose views lay outside the political
mainstream.78 But are those interests and individuals better off either
in the short or long term, with an adverse constitutional decision, one
that is dictated more by structural than individual concerns, simply
because a constitutional conversation (recriminations do not count)
may be prompted? Does a theoretical construct of "democracy in ac-
tion" trump an inevitable constriction of individual liberties? Some-
times maybe. But often maybe not.
76 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
77 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
78 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 3, at 3.
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